Biblische Zeitschrift

herausgegeben von

Dr. Josef Schreiner
Professor der neutestamentlichen Exegese
an der Universität in Würzburg

Dr. Rudolf Schnackenburg
Professor der neutestamentlichen Exegese
an der Universität in Würzburg

Neue Folge 1978 Jahrgang 22 — Heft 2

INHALT

M. Throbold, Der Primat der Synchronie vor der Diachronie als Grundaxiom der Literarkritik ........................................... 161

B. Mayer, Überlieferungs- und redaktionsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Mk 6,1—6 a ..................................................... 187

L. Ruppert, Erhöhungsverstellungen im Alten Testament .............. 199

H. Irigler, Äquivalenz in Poetik ..................................................... 221

D. Kienzle, Theologische Reflexion im ugaritischen Ba’al-Zyklus .... 236

KLEINERE BEITRÄGE

G. Reim, Job 9 — Tradition und zeitgenössische messianische Diskussion 245

W. Grudem, A Response to Gerhard Dautzenberg on 1 Cor. 12.10 .... 253

J. Kürzinger, Frau und Mann nach 1 Kor 11, 11 f. ....................... 270

UMSCHAU UND KRIKTIK

Neutestamentliche Rezensionen ............................................ 276
Altertestamentliche Rezensionen ........................................... 284
Hinweise ............................................................................. 314

FERDINAND SCHÖNINGH PADERBORN

ISSN 0006-2014
A Response to Gerhard Dautzenberg on 1 Cor. 12, 10

In his brief study «Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Hintergrund der διάκρισις πνεύματων (1 Kor 12, 10)» 1 and later in his book, *Urchristliche Prophete* 2, Gerhard Dautzenberg argues that 1 Cor. 12, 10 speaks not of “distinguishing between spirits” but of “interpreting the revelations of the Spirit” (which are spoken through prophecy). If διάκρισις πνεύματων in 1 Cor. 14, 29 then means, “let the others interpret” (what each prophet says). Professor Dautzenberg has done valuable work in challenging some of our uncritically-held assumptions about the meaning of διάκρισις πνεύματων in 1 Cor. 12, 10, and has also called to our attention many lexical and historical data useful for understanding oracles and dream interpretation in the ancient world. But it may be questioned whether he has established a convincing argument for translating 1 Cor. 12, 10, “interpreting the revelations of the Spirit”. It is possible to summarize his argument in five points:

30 Erstmalige Parallelen zu Arbeitsweise und Theologie des Evangelisten in Joh 9 gibt es in Joh Material in Joh 4:

a) Joh 4,13-15 / Joh 9, 5: Deuterojesajantische Selbstprädikation als Wasser, das jeglichen Durst stillt (Jes 55, 1-5) bzw. als Licht der Welt (Jes 49, 6). Es kann getrunken werden bzw. in ihm kann man sich waschen.

b) Joh 4,13 / Joh 9, 7: Der Meister kann getragen werden bzw. in ihm kann man sich begeben.


f) Joh 4, 22f / Joh 9, 38: Gespräch über Proskyne um bzw. vollzogene Proskyne.

g) Joh 4, 41f / Joh 9, 40f: Glaube bzw. Unglaube von Zahörern.

1. The gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων is connected with prophecy in 1 Cor. 12.10 and 14.29.

2. Διακρίνω and διάκρισις mean "interpret" and "interpretation" in these verses, for several reasons.
   a. Διάκρισις and διάκρισις belong to Greek interpretation terminology. As such, they are used interchangeably with συγκρίνω/σύγκρισις to translate Hebrew / Aramaic "סער/()['".
   b. Since there is often a connection between revelation and interpretation in post-biblical Judaism, a reference to such interpretative activity would have been understood by the Corinthians 4.
   c. This position would allow διάκρισις and διάκρισις to be translated with the same sense (something not normally possible with other positions).
   d. The other proposed meanings for 12.10 and 14.29, "distinguish", "judge", and "test", are all unacceptable.

3. The history of religions argument in favor of the translation, "distinguishing between spirits", is inadequate, for neither 1 Th. 5.19-21 nor 1 Jn. 4.1-6 nor Did. 11 provides an adequate parallel.

4. Πνευμάτων in 12.10 means "revelations of the Spirit".

5. The context of 1 Cor. 12-14 requires this position:
   a. If 1 Cor. 12.3 provides a test for distinguishing between spirits, then that same interpretation is excluded for 12.10.
   b. We have no evidence of a problem of false prophecy at Corinth at this point, but to translate "distinguishing between spirits", one would have to assume that.
   c. In 1 Cor. 12-14 the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων is not "super-charisma" set over the others, but if it were a gift of distinguishing between spirits, it would certainly have come to assume such superior status.

It now remains to subject each of these five arguments to rigorous scrutiny, to see whether they compel our acceptance.

An Analysis of Dautzenberg's Arguments

1. Διάκρισις πνευμάτων is connected with prophecy in 1 Cor. 12.10 and 14.29.

Dautzenberg's argument in 12.10 depends on his ability to divide the list of nine gifts in vss. 8-10 into four unequal groups, namely (i) λόγος

---

8 UP, 121.
9 UP, 125; "Intergrund", 94-102.
10 UP, 125.
11 UP, 124; 126.
12 UP, 126-129.
14 UP, 135-142.
15 UP, 142-146; "Intergrund", 93.
16 UP, 147.
17 UP, 122.
18 UP, 123.
reserved for last, and interpretation was joined to it, while the other gifts were listed with no conscious order intended.

c) Do other Pauline passages indicate additional relationship between any two gifts such as the special relationship between tongues and interpretation? Here also the answer must be no. The only special relationships which might be suggested are found in Rom. 12:6, where prophecy is connected with faith (εἰς προφητείαν κατά τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως), and 1 Cor. 13:2, where prophecy is connected with knowledge. But these connections argue against Dauthenberg's supposed groupings in 1 Cor. 12:8–10, since there prophecy is separated from both faith and knowledge. And even these are not functionally interdependent relationships of the tongues-interpretation type, for one might have a gift of faith or knowledge without the gift of prophecy, and one might prophecy without having a special "charisma" of faith or knowledge. In 1 Cor. 14:29 one might say that there is a special relationship between prophecy and διάρκειας πνευμάτων, but that contention depends on an assumption that 14:26 refers to the gift of διάρκειας πνευμάτων, an assumption which will be challenged in some detail below.

Whereas tongues and interpretation are explicitly grouped together by Paul again and again in a way that his readers could not miss (12:10 (where it is ἐρμήγενον γ' κας κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως)), 12:20, 14:5, 13:26, 27, 28), Paul can discuss prophecy in several places without any mention of διάρκειας πνευμάτων (Rom. 12:6, 1 Cor. 12:29, 14:5, 24–25). In these contexts, if διάρκειας πνευμάτων had been essential to the proper functioning or understandability of prophecy, we might have expected it to be mentioned. So it is doubtful whether 1 Cor. 12:8–10 implies any special relationship between two or more gifts, other than the special relationship between tongues and interpretation.

(d) Is "faith, healings, miracles" really a convincing group? Can one perceive, as Dauthenberg suggests, a "sachliche Zusammengehörigkeit" among these three gifts? Once again, it is necessary to express some doubt. Of course, this is not to deny that faith is in some way related to the gifts of healing and working of miracles. But because of its fundamental nature faith can be said to be related to several of the gifts, such as prophecy in Rom. 12:6. The question, rather, is whether there is such an evident unity among faith, healings and miracles that we are compelled to say that Paul intentionally grouped them together. Neither stylistic evidence, nor discussion elsewhere, nor the specific use of the gifts, makes one sure that the group "faith, healings, miracles" indicates an intentional assembling by Paul of gifts which by nature belonged together. And if we have serious doubts about whether these three are intentionally juxtaposed, then we can entertain any certainty about whether there is in 1 Cor. 12:10 an intentional relationship between prophecy and διάρκειας πνευμάτων?

(a) Might Paul have simply listed several gifts in 1 Cor. 12:8–10 as they came to mind, without intending to imply any special interconnections among them? In view of the preceding considerations, this certainly must be considered a strong possibility. Of course Paul must have consciously reserved tongues, the problem gift at Corinth, until the end, and with it its necessary concomitant, interpretation of tongues. But except for that special pair, one wonders if Paul had any other pairs of gifts in mind. When he began to compile a list of gifts to show the diversity of the Spirit's working he may well have mentioned individual gifts as he thought of them. Δύος φορτισμένος perhaps reminded him of δύος γνώσεως, and from there many gifts came not in groups but individually to mind.

One probably cannot reach complete certainty on this question. But at least it can be said that the supposed connection between prophecy and διάρκειας πνευμάτων in 1 Cor. 12:10 is certainly not an obvious one. Indeed, one may well question whether Paul intends to indicate any special relationship at all.

In 1 Cor. 14:29 the question is different. Here Paul clearly relates prophecy and the activity indicated by the verb δισταῖνει: προφητεύειν ἐν δόκιμῳ κατὰ εὐθείαν δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλ' ἐν δύοις δισταῖνειν. But it may not be so readily assumed, as Dauthenberg does, that the activity designated here by the verb δισταῖνειν is the same as that designated by the phrase διάρκειας πνευμάτων in 12:10.

In favor of such a connection are two factors, the proximity to a mention of prophecy in both 12:10 and 14:29, and the fact that δισταῖνειν in 14:29 is the verb which corresponds to the noun διάρκειας in 12:10. As for the first factor, I have argued above that it is very difficult to show that the juxtaposition of prophecy and δισταῖνειν, even in 12:10 is anything other than fortuitous. And to use 14:14 as evidence for a special relationship between the two gifts in 12:10, while using the relationship between the two gifts in 12:10 to show that the same gift is discussed in 14:29, would simply be to argue in a circle. Dauthenberg's case for one verse, must be firmly established on independent grounds before he can use it to argue his case for the other verse.

Concerning the use of δισταῖνειν in 12:10 and δισταῖνειν in 14:29, it must be noted that both the noun and verb have an extremely wide range of meaning. It is not at all impossible that Paul would have used δισταῖνειν in 12:10 to mean "distinguishing" (among different kinds of spirits) while using δισταῖνειν in 14:29 to mean something quite different, such as "evaluate" or "judge" (prophetic utterances). In fact, in 1 Cor. alone Paul uses δισταῖνειν in several senses: in 11:31 it means "evaluate", in 1 Cor. 11:29, "distinguishing" (or "evaluate"), in 6:5, "give a legal judgment", and 4:7, "distinguishing". In Rom. 14:1 he apparently means "arguments" or "disputes" by δισταῖνειν. In view of this wide range of Pauline meaning, it would be overly bold to assume that διάρκειας in 12:10 must have the

15 On p. 101 he refers to general recognition of this connection in the literature on 1 Cor. But such a connection is surely not as generally recognized as Dauthenberg implies. Note the following commentators who hold that the δύος δισταῖνεται in 14:29 refers not to those who have the gift of "distinguishing between basic spirits" but to the entire congregation: Barrett, 328; Bruce, 134; Godel, II, 303I; Lietzmann, 74; also E. Cothen, "Prophétie dans le Nouveau Testament", in Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplément, Vol. 6, col. L. Pirro et al. (Paris, 1972), col. 1299.

16 V. Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 274, says, "It is impossible to find a consistent rendering of the word distinguish (δισταῖνειν), because Paul did not use it consistently."
same sense as διακρίνω in 14.29, and must refer to the same kind of act or gift.

So if we are asking whether of ἄλλα διακρινόμενα in 14.29 refers to the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων in 12.10, the only two positive arguments, an alleged connection between prophecy and διάκρισις πνευμάτων in 12.10, and a somewhat parallel form of expression, both turn out on examination to be quite weak.

At this point it must be recognized that only by assuming the correctness of his view of 12.10 can Dautenbergen conclude that the same gift is in view in 12.10 and 14.29. If we assume that 12.10 means "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit which are spoken by prophets", then of course we could conclude that 14.29 means, 'let the others interpret what the prophets say'. But it is hardly fair to assume the conclusion in order to support one of the arguments in its favor. Again, this would be circular reasoning.

If we disallow such circular reasoning here, and if instead we accept for a moment the more common view of 12.10 and 14.29, then there are strong reasons why 14.29 does not refer to the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων. First, the objects are different. In 14.29 it is the speeches of the prophets which are evaluated or judged. Dautenbergen himself admits that the prophetic speeches, not the prophets themselves or the spirits by which they speak, are the objects of διακρίνω in 14.29. But in 12.10, if we do not assume Dautenbergen’s conclusions, it is spirits that are distinguished.

Second, there are different groups of people mentioned. In 12.10 only a limited number of people in the congregation have this gift, as with any other gift Paul mentions (καὶ ἄλλα διάκρισις πνευμάτων, and cf. 12.29–30). But in 14.29, if διακρίνω means "evaluate", then there would seem to be no reason for thinking that only those with the gift of "distinguishazione between men" could evaluate prophecies. Could not teachers, administrators, apostles, other prophets, and indeed all believers at least silently evaluate διακρίνω a prophecy as they heard it? Where judgment of speech before the church is mentioned elsewhere in Paul’s writings, it seems that all the congregation is involved (1 Cor. 12.3, 1 Th. 5:21; cf. 1 Jn. 4:1–6, Ac. 17.11). So in 14.29, in contrast to 12.10, διακρίνω refers to an activity carried out by the entire congregation. Thus, on the more common view of 12.10 and 14.29, both different people and different objects are involved.

These two considerations make it very unlikely that the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων is referred to by the phrase of ἄλλα διακρινόμενα in 14.29. Of course, if Dautenbergen could establish his view of 12.10 as "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" on other grounds, then 14.29 could be made consistent with that interpretation. But until that view of 12.10 is established on other grounds, he should not be allowed to claim 14.29 in support of his case, as if it obviously contained a reference to διάκρισις πνευμάτων.

In conclusion, Dautenbergen claims that the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων is connected with prophecy in both 1 Cor. 12.10 and 14.29. But on closer examination it appears that we must retain serious doubt about the connection in both verses. In 12.10 it seems unlikely that there is any intentional or meaningful connection between the two gifts, and in 14.29, unless Dautenbergen can prove his view of 12.10 on independent grounds, it is very improbable that there is any reference to the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων.

2. Διακρίνω and διάκρισις mean "interpret, interpretation" here.

Dautenbergen has correctly pointed out that διάκρισις and διακρίνω can be used as technical terms for the interpretation of dreams in Philo 20, in Symmachus’s translation of Gen. 40.8 21, and in Pausanias and Artemidorus (both 2nd c. A.D.) 22. To his list should be added the two instances in T. Abr. (A) 4 23.

He also notes that διακρίνω is used in Jos. A. 8.148 (= Ap. 1.114) to speak of "solving" riddles 24, and at least once in Greek literature is used of the interpretation of signs 25. Finally, there is one instance of διακρίνω to mean "explain, interpret" spoken oracles (μνήμη). This is Stobaeus, Erigol 4.50.95 (5th c. AD), where he is quoting Juncus (a philosopher, perhaps from the 2nd c. AD, known only through the writings of Stobaeus) 26. Dautenbergen’s one example of διακρίνω from the Apostolic Fathers, Herm. Sim. 2.1 27, can be omitted here, for it simply means "consider, ponder" (a vine and an alms).

These instances of διάκρισις and διακρίνω can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Number of Instances</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of dreams</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1st-2nd c. AD (Philo, Symmachus, T. Abr., Paus., Artemid.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving riddles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1st c. AD (Josephus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of signs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1st c. BC (Diod. Sic.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of oracles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5th c. AD (Stobaeus), or perhaps 2nd c. AD (Juncus)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is certainly safe to conclude from this evidence that διακρίνω and διάκρισις could be used as technical terms to refer to the interpretation of dreams, signs, and oracles.

---

20 "Hintergründen", 90f. Dautenbergen lists διακρίνω in Jos. 90, 104 and 143, and διάκρισις in Som. 2.7 and Jos. 95, 119, 125, 269. To this list should be added διακρίσις in Som. 2.4 and Jos. 248, and διάκρισις in Som. 2.110 and Jos. 98 and 115.
21 "Hintergründen", 89f. (διακρίνω and διάκρισις once each).
22 "Hintergründen", 89f. (Artemid. Oneirocriclion, Proem; 4, 1, Paus. 1.34.5).
23 This text is of uncertain date, but perhaps may be placed in the 1st century AD (IDB 1.21).
24 "Hintergründen", 101.
25 "Hintergründen", 95. He lists only Diodorus Siculus 17.10.5 (1st c. BC). Cf. also (perhaps) Mt. 16.3.
26 15, xxvii, xxxv.
27 "Hintergründen", 102.
of dreams, at least from the 1st c. AD. Whether they could also have been used to interpret prophecies is still difficult to say. The single example from Stobaeus is the closest parallel, but it is very late, and it is not clear how similar this oracle was to early Christian prophecy.

A better decision can be made after taking into account more information about the functions of διαψως, διαφως, and other words used for interpreting obscure oracles in the time of the New Testament. In this regard, several observations can be made.

(a) θέλω and διαφως are not generally used to translate ἔντυσις and ἔντυσιν. This contention is contrary to Dautzenberg’s implication in UP, 125 and Hintergrund, 100, 103, but it is clearly seen if all the data are examined. The following list gives the total number of times each Hebrew or Aramaic word is translated by the Greek words listed. This list includes every available example of direct translation of these words from the LXX, Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aramaic</th>
<th>LXX</th>
<th>Aqu., Sm., Th.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>יָסָר (verb)</td>
<td>סָגַדְרְנָו 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>יָסָר (noun)</td>
<td>סָגַדְרְנָו 8</td>
<td>סָגַדְרְנָו 25 (all Th.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>יָסָר (noun)</td>
<td>סָגַדְרְנָו 4</td>
<td>סָגַדְרְנָו 4 (all Th.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>יָסָר (noun)</td>
<td>כֶּלְּעָּס 1 (Th. Dan. 5.16)</td>
<td>כֶּלְּעָּס 1 (Sm. Dan. 2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>יָסָר (noun)</td>
<td>כֶּלְּעָּס 2</td>
<td>כֶּלְּעָּס 2 (all Sm. Gen. 40.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>יָסָר (noun)</td>
<td>כֶּלְּעָּס 1 (Sm. Gen. 40.8)</td>
<td>כֶּלְּעָּס 1 (Sm. Gen. 40.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) In Jewish and Christian literature, διαψως and διαψως are not generally interchangeable with other χρίω words in interpretation contexts. Dautzenberg correctly points out that Philo in Mig. 19 and Jos. 158 uses σύγχρος instead of his usual διάψως to speak of Joseph’s interpretation of dreams. This does not show that διάψως and σύγχρος are precise synonyms, but simply that at this particular point, σύγχρος is a technical term for interpreting dreams. This range of meaning of σύγχρος comes to overlap with that of διάψως (at least in Philo’s usage). One can understand how this might have been so, when “combine” and “compare” were common meanings for σύγχρος and “evaluate,” “understand correctly” and “separate” were acceptable meanings for διάψως. Each of these activities played a part in interpreting dreams, and each term could have come to have the general sense “interpret” when applied to dreams.

Now this semantic overlap might or might not have occurred with χρίω words in other contexts, such as interpreting prophecies, or writings, or parables, etc. We cannot predict in advance whether or not it would happen or not. It is possible that one word group or both would remain as a technical term for interpreting dreams and would not be used in any other context to mean “interpret.” In fact, in some contexts σύγχρος as “combine” and διάψως as “separate” (or διάψως “separation”) are used as exact antonyms: Philo speaks of death as the separation of things that had been in combination (σώσεν συγκρίνων) (Leg. All. 106; cf. Quad Deus 82), namely, soul and body.

What we do find throughout Jewish and Christian literature is that we can find the word group διάψως and χρίω words are never intermembers of the σύγχρος and διάψως word groups are never interchangeable and never have overlapping meanings outside of the particular context of dream interpretation (Philo, Mig. 19, Jos. 158, and Symm. Gen. 40.8). Distinct meanings are maintained in all other contexts.

---

28 These are the only examples of direct translation which are relevant for our purposes. Dautzenberg also mentions Philo’s recounting of the Joseph story. 29 With the Hebrew וַיָּשָר יָסָר and the loanword וַיָּשָר, out of 18 examples we find two instances of translation with διάψως and διαψως. These are both in Symmachus’s 2nd-century AD translation and can be taken as further evidence of the fact that διάψως and διαψως could serve as technical terms to refer to the interpretation of dreams. But that does not necessarily imply that they could be used to translate וַיָּשָר in other contexts.

However, when members of the וַיָּשָר and וַיָּשָר word groups are translated 52 times by σύγχρος and related words and only twice by διάψως or διαψως, it seems to be an unjustified blurring of the evidence for Dautzenberg to make such general statements as, “σύγχρος and διαψως haben ihr Gewicht als Deutenausdrücke gerade durch das griechisch sprechende Judentum erlitten,” or, “In jüdischen Texten begegnen σύγχρος and διαψως als Übersetzungsvarianten für וַיָּשָר וַיָּשָר. The evidence is not nearly as strong as those statements would suggest.”
of obscure words 42. Indeed, in all of Greek literature, Dautzenberg has produced no examples of διάρκεια or διάρχεια used in this way except the one late quotation in Stobaeus 42. So the sense he proposes for διάρκεια in 1 Cor. 12.10 would be unique and unprecedented for its time.

(d) Jewish and Christian authors prefer other terms when speaking of the interpretation or explanation of prophecies and other obscure words. This is a highly significant fact. Since διάρκεια and διάρχεια are used of interpreting dreams (and perhaps also of “solving” riddles), we should realize that they might have come to be used of interpreting prophecies or other obscure words as well. But when we examine the actual data, it becomes clear that Jewish and Christian writers consistently prefer to use other terms when they have occasion to talk about the interpretation of utterances or writings which are difficult to understand. The following list includes a large number of instances where Jewish or early Christian authors use a Greek term to refer to the interpretation or explanation of any spoken or written words. (Terms used to refer to “translation” from one known language to another are not included here.)

Words Used to Mean “Interpret, Interpretation, Interpreter”

Interpretation or explanation of Scripture passages (or Mosaic laws)

Διάρρηξις Lk. 24.7 (of OT prophecies, at least in part); Philo, Sob. 35

Διάγνωσμα Jos. A. 18.81, B. 2.162; Philo Hyp. 7.13

Διάρκεια Jos. A. 1.12; Philo Vii. Cont. 75

Διάρρηξις Jos. A. 17.149, 214, 216; Philo, Spec. Leg. 2.159

ἐπίπλωμα 2 Pet. 1.20 (of prophecies)

ἐπιλόχον Philo, Vii. Cont. 75

ἐρμήνευσις Lk. 24.27 (C); Jos. A. 20.264

κρύφα Jos. B. 5.312 44

Interpretation or explanation of obscure sayings, or words difficult to understand

Διάγνωσμα Jos. A. 19.196

42 Probably the closest instance would be Jos. A. B. 149 (= Ap. 1.144), where it is said that Solomon sent riddles to Hiram of Tyre, proposing that “σοι δείξης διάρρηξις τι λάονει χρήματα συνείσασθαι”. Josephus gives this as a διάρρηξις διακρινεῖ τι καὶ λαονει χρήματα συνείσασθαι. He also has a διάρρηξις here quotation from an otherwise unknown profane historian, Dion. 44. It is difficult to understand this as a διάρρηξις. For the use of διάρρηξις in the context of “solving”, solutions, for λόγος is used both here and a few lines later to mean “solve”, solutions), but διάρχεια might also be taken to mean “solve”, as a synonym for λόγος but this also is difficult to understand. When not quoting someone else, would certainly not be a clear example. When quoting someone else, Josephus himself chooses λόγος to speak of solving riddles and hard questions.

43 There is one other problem with the quotation from Stobaeus: it refers not to interpreting a prophecy but to interpreting a parable, a term which often to interpreting a prophecy but to interpreting a parable, a term which often refers to mantic ecstasy among the pagans, and a term which Jewish and Christian authors never use of their own prophecies.

44 I have not attempted to compile a complete list of the times ἐρμηνεύσις and ἐπιλόχον are used to mean “interpret”. BAG. 452-454, give no instances for early Christian literature.
examples where διδάσκως means "distinguishing between", the two classes of things to be distinguished are always explicitly named (for example, Heb. 5:14: ἕκριτος διδάσκως καλόν πείνα καὶ κακόν). So if διδάσκως were to mean "distinguishing" in 1 Cor. 12.10, the verse would have to say something like διδάσκως καλόν καὶ κακόν πνεύματα.

Dauthenbarg's objection is inadequate here: he only examines the examples given in Bauer's lexicon (Bauer, 267 = BAAG, 184). When other examples of διδάσκως are examined, it is clear that there are instances when the whole class of things among which distinctions are to be made is named (as in 1 Cor. 12.10, if it means "distinguishing between spirits"). Psalm, 2.39, speaks of the man who "sims at analysis and distinction of things" (ὁ δὲ τούτος καὶ διακρίνεις προμάνησις ἐμφανισθείται). In 2 Sam. 3.3, Dan is the symbol of distinguishing and analyzing matters (διακρίνεις δὲ τούτος προμάνησις). Plant. 45 says that God placed man's mind in the universe to be played upon by opposing forces, so that it might be called to distinguish between them (καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τὸν καὶ τὸν βαίνοντα). 50 I Cl. 46.5, which speaks of a man καίδειν ἐν διακρίσει λόγον, should probably be translated "wise in the distinguishing of words (or arguments)". Dauthenbarg's objection that good and bad words are not specified sounds again like circular reasoning: (a) διδάσκως can only mean "distinguishing" when both items are named, because (b) it does not mean "distinguishing" in other similar places; and (c) it does not mean "distinguishing" in other similar places because (d) both items are not named.

From being linguistically unprecedented, as Dauthenbarg claims, the interpretation "distinguishing between spirits" has several good stylistic parallels in Jewish and early Christian literature and should be considered a very likely meaning for 1 Cor. 12.10.

To summarize this linguistic investigation: the translation "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" in 1 Cor. 12.10 uses a meaning of διδάσκως which was not used at the time of the New Testament. Furthermore, there were several other terms which Jewish and Christian authors used to speak of the interpretation of prophecies or other obscure words. If Paul had meant "interpreting" in 1 Cor. 12.10, he would almost certainly have used one of these other terms, not διδάσκως. By contrast, "distinguishing between spirits" uses a common and widely-understood meaning for διδάσκως, and the stylistic construction has several good parallels.

---

45 I have included tongues here because this kind of speech might possibly be considered similar to prophecy in that it was considered a speech gift empowered by the Holy Spirit. If someone should prefer to count these instances as "translation" and therefore dissimilar to prophecy, the total number of instances would be reduced to 50.

46 See the examples on p. 263 below.

47 Cf. pp. 262-263, above.

48 UP, 128, 129.

49 The immediately following context requires that διδάσκως mean "distinguishing", and not "interpretations", and so does the passage in Sam. 2.39 to which this refers.

50 "Making decisions" is a less likely translation here, because διδάσκως generally has that sense only as a technical term for judicial decisions (LS, 399).

51 UP, 127.

52 Other examples grammatically similar to 1 Cor. 12.10 but with different meanings for διδάσκως are Rom. 14.1, Philo, Op. 126, Leg. All. 1.306, Mos. 1.212. In none of these cases, are both items mentioned; rather, the Job, 31.16 (AB). In none of these cases, are both items mentioned; rather, the Job 31.16 (AB). In none of these cases, are both items mentioned; rather, the Job 31.16 (AB). In none of these cases, are both items mentioned; rather, the Job 31.16 (AB).
3. The history of religious argumen.

Dautzenberg in this section attempts to show that neither 1 Th. 5. 19-21 nor 1 Jn. 4, 1-6 nor Did. 11. 7 is sufficiently similar to the situation one has to suppose in 1 Cor. 12. 10 if it meant 'distinguishing between spirits'. It is interesting that these are the three texts he chooses to analyze, for only one of them — 1 Jn. 4. 1-6 — has any mention of evil spirits. He is of course correct in deciding that the other two texts have little to do with 1 Cor. 12. 10.

Yet the fact that Dautzenberg chose to deal only with these texts, all of which mention prophecy, shows that he has made an entirely unwarranted assumption. He has assumed that διακρίνεις πνευμάτων in 1 Cor. 12. 10, even if it deals with 'distinguishing between spirits', only deals with distinguishing between spirits of the prophets. But 1 Cor. 12. 10 does not say διακρίνεις πνευμάτων προφητείαν. It simply says διακρίνεις πνευμάτων. It is not legitimate to presuppose that 1 Cor. 12. 10 is restricted to the teaching of prophets and prophecies. Bitteliner, for instance, mentions as examples of διακρίνεις πνευμάτων some of the exorcisms of Jesus where he knew there was a demon present, and the cases of Elymas (Ac. 13. 8f) and the soothsaying girl (Ac. 16. 16-18) 54. Robertson and Plummer define the ability as, "the gift of discerning in various cases (hence the plur.) whether extraordinary spiritual manifestations were from above or not" 55. If we resist the temptation to read into the text a limitation to the testing of prophecies, then a more general definition, like the one just mentioned by Robertson and Plummer, is in order. Something like "the ability to recognize the influence of the Holy Spirit or of demonic spirits in a person", might be suggested.

This means that any situation in which first century Christians would have seen demonic influence was a potential opportunity for the use of the gift of διακρίνεις πνευμάτων. Was some sickness the result of demonic influence (cf. Mt. 12. 22, Mk. 9. 32-34)? Then the person with this gift could recognize it, and the demon could be cast out. Was an evil spirit causing someone to interrupt preaching or teaching or worship services (cf. Ac. 16. 16-18)? Then the person with this gift could recognize the source of the trouble. Was someone prophesying by the power of an evil spirit (1 Jn. 4. 1-6)? Then the person with this gift could call attention to it. Since it was thought that demons were involved in pagan worship in Corinth (cf. 1 Cor. 10. 20f), one can imagine a large number of cases where this gift would have been thought useful. Once διακρίνεις πνευμάτων is understood in this way, Dautzenberg's third objection loses its force.

52 Bitteliner, Gifts and Graces, 46. Other commentators who see "distinguishing between spirits" as applying to more than just prophecy include Calvin, 263, Grosheide, 287f, Findlay, 869, and Lenski, 503f. Those who do restrict it to prophecy generally refer to 1 Jn. 4. 1-6 and Did. 11, but give no further arguments.

54 1 Corinthians, 267. They soon say, "Perhaps the expression chiefly refers to the prophetic gift", but they do not restrict it to that.

55 UP, 117.
56 UP, 116f.
57 UP, 113-114.
"highly developed" abilities which correspond to general abilities possessed by all believers. Faith, words of wisdom and knowledge, teaching, administration and "helps" (1 Cor. 12.28) are a few examples; more are found in Rom. 12.7–8. So 1 Cor. 12.3 might provide a general test for distinguishing those who are speaking under the influence of an evil spirit, and 1 Cor. 12.10 could speak of a special ability possessed by those who were very proficient in evaluating speakers who were supposedly under some "spiritual" influence.

Second, there may be a difference in the type of evaluation done. While 12.3 speaks of an objective test which could be applied to determine whether spoken words conformed to a certain explicit standard, 12.10 may describe a more subjective or internal kind of evaluation. Robertson and Flummer say, "An intuitive discernment is implied, without the application of tests" 58.

Third, the test in 12.3 seems to be applicable primarily to those who speak before the congregation, while 12.10 may speak of an ability to evaluate many other people as well, such as those who are ill, those who perform miracles, etc.

These suggested differences are enough to show that the existence of one kind of test for evil spirits in 1 Cor. 12.3 does not necessarily preclude the mention of a related but different ability in 1 Cor. 12.10.

The other two arguments which Dautzenberg raises from the context of 1 Cor. 12–14 also make certain unjustified assumptions. The objection that there is no evidence of a problem with false prophecy at Corinth is based on an assumption that 1 Cor. 12.10 would have to deal only with "distinguishing between the spirits of the prophets", an assumption which has been seriously challenged above. The objection that "distinguishing between spirits" would become a "super-charisma" if it existed, fails to recognize that distinguishing between spirits, like other gifts (such as words of wisdom, words of knowledge, teaching or administration), may well have been subject to confirmation or reevaluation by other members of the congregation.

So Dautzenberg's last argument, the argument from the context of 1 Cor. 12–14, does not raise any unanswerable objections against the view that 1 Cor. 12.10 speaks of the ability to distinguish between spirits.

Further Objections to Dautzenberg's Position

Each of Dautzenberg's five arguments has now been examined in some detail, and each one has been found to have serious deficiencies. However, there remain some additional weighty objections to Dautzenberg's position which should be mentioned.

1. Dautzenberg's view lacks historical confirmation.

We must realize that there is simply no evidence that early Christian prophets ever actually spoke with the aid of an interpreter. When there are examples of prophets in Acts, for example, no interpreter is ever mentioned (cf. Ac. 11.28, 19.6, 21.4, 21.9, 21.10–11). Furthermore, those prophecies at least seem to have needed no interpretation: they were apparently immediately understandable to the hearers (cf. Ac. 11.26, 21.4, 21.10–11). Yet 1 Cor. 14.29 certainly seems to be a general procedural rule which Paul expected to be followed for every prophecy. And at least two, and perhaps several or all of the members of the congregation are comprehended in of ἀποκρύφως. So if Dautzenberg is correct, should we not suppose that every prophecy would have to have been interpreted, and by two or more people in every case? This would make "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" a very prominent activity, and it would be difficult to understand why we have no other mention of it.

2. ὅτι ἰδεῖν in 1 Cor. 14.29 implies evaluation, not interpretation.

It must be noticed that Paul's instructions for the interpretation of tongues are general enough to allow the tongue-speaker himself to interpret his own utterance: καὶ ἰδεῖν. The καὶ who interprets could be the one who speaks (cf. 1 Cor. 14.13). This is acceptable where no evaluation or judgement is in view. But Paul's instructions with respect to prophets are different: καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. Now if only interpretation or explanation of the prophecies was intended, there would seem to be no good reason to forbid the prophet himself from being his own interpreter by saying, "Let the others interpret". But if evaluation or judgement of the prophecies was intended, then the prophet himself would not be sufficiently impartial to pass judgement on his own prophecy. Then the phrase of ἰδεῖν would become very understandable. Others must evaluate the prophecy, for the prophet himself cannot do it.

3. Dautzenberg's position is foreign to Paul's emphasis on the understandable nature of Christian prophecy.

Throughout 1 Cor. 14 Paul emphasizes the contrast between the gift of tongues, which are unintelligible and therefore require an interpreter, and the gift of prophecy, which is intelligible. If someone speaks in a tongue, no one understands him (14.2), but one who prophesies speaks to men (14.3). The tongue speaker needs an interpreter in order to edify the church, but the prophet apparently does not (14.5). Tongues are unintelligible (14.9), and drive unbelievers away (14.23). But prophecy calls unbelievers to account and convicts them of sin (14.24–25), presumably with words which they could understand.

Now it is true that the revelation to the prophet may not always be completely clear to him, and may in fact sometimes be obscure in parts. But there is a great difference between an understandable prophecy with a few obscure details, and a prophecy which is so obscure that it needs an interpreter in order to edify others.

58 1 Corinthians, 257.
59 Dautzenberg realizes the force of this objection and tries to make 14.24–25 speak of a special function of prophecy, that of Überlieferung (UP, 123, n. 7, 267). But this is simply a special pleading: 1 Cor. 14.24–25 is part of Paul's overall argument for the use of prophecy instead of uninterpreted tongues in the worship service.
It is not enough, then, for Dautenberg to object that, unlike tongues, prophecies are **intelligible** (that is, they are spoken in words which the congregation can understand), but they are not **understandable** (that is, their meaning is obscure). This position still does not explain how apparently uninterpreted prophecies can benefit the congregation.

**Conclusion**

Professor Dautenberg’s proposal that διάφορα πνευμάτων in 1 Cor. 12, 10 means “interpreting the revelations of the Spirit” (which are spoken by prophets) is supported by five major arguments. Each of these arguments, upon careful analysis, turns out to be unconvincing. In particular, it was found that many different words are used by Jewish and Christian authors to refer to the interpretation of prophecies and other inspired or obscure speech, but διάφορα is not one of them. Nor was πνευμάτων a clear word to apply to “revelations of the Spirit” spoken through the prophets: προφητεύω would have been much better. Dautenberg’s view also lacks historical confirmation and seems to conflict with Paul’s emphasis on the understandable nature of prophecy and his desire that others respond to the prophecy (1 Cor. 14, 29). So the more common translation, “distinguishing between spirits”, is still to be preferred.


**Frau und Mann nach 1 Kor 11, 1ff**

Nur wenige Stellen im Neuen Testament sind bezüglich ihrer Deutung so unsicher und damit für eine überzeugende Übersetzung so problematisch wie die beiden Verse 1 Kor 11, 1ff. Sie finden sich in dem Abschnitt, in dem der Apostel die Forderungen ausdrückt, daß die Frau in der gottesdienstlichen Versammlung – wenn sie «betet oder prophetisch redet» – einen Schleier auf ihrem Haupt zu tragen habe 11, 3-16. Im Zusammenhang gehen den beiden Versen die Sätze voraus: «Das Haupt eines jeden Mannes ist Christus, das Haupt der Frau ist der Mann, und das Haupt Christi ist Gott 11, 3 ... Darum soll die Frau (das Zeichen der) Macht (Iκονοστάσις) auf dem Haupte tragen, der Engel wegen» 11, 10. Hier nun schließen sich die Sätze 11, 1ff an. Sie machen deutlich den Eindruck eines klaren Zusatzes zum eben Gesagten. Unmittelbar darauf greift der Apostel nochmals seine Forderung auf, wenn er auf «die Natur» hinweist, durch die der Mann das Haar als Schleier gebe 11, 13-16.

Was bedeutet nun im Zusammenhang unser Einschub VV. 11ff? Er besteht aus zwei logisch einander zugeordneten Sätzen. Wir wenden uns zunächst dem Vordersatz V. 11 zu. Dena gerade bei ihm bewegen sich die Erklärungen im Unsicheren. Der griechische Text lautet: προφητεύω ἡπλαὶ γυνὴ χωρὶς ἄνδρας ὀφθαλμῷ ἀνὴρ χωρὶς ἄνδρος όφθαλμῳ γυναικῶς ἐν Κυριω. Für die bisher üblichen Übersetzungen und das entsprechende Verständnis ist – wie sich zeigen läßt – weitgehend die lateinische Vulgata von verhängnisvollem Einfluß ge-