

410
68

DEU 10 1978

Biblische Zeitschrift

herausgegeben von

Dr. Josef Schreiner
Professor der alttestamentlichen Exegese
an der Universität in Würzburg

Dr. Rudolf Schnackenburg
Professor der neutestamentlichen Exegese
an der Universität in Würzburg

Neue Folge

1978

Jahrgang 22 — Heft 2

INHALT

M. Theobald, Der Primat der Synchronie vor der Diachronie als Grundaxiom der Literaturkritik 161

B. Meyer, Oberlieferungs- und redaktionsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu Mk 6, 1—6 a 187

L. Ruppert, Erhöhungsvorstellungen im Alten Testament 199

H. Irsigler, Äquivalenz in Poesie 221

D. Kinert, Theologische Reflexion im ugaritischen Ba'al-Zyklus 236

KLEINERE BEITRÄGE

G. Reim, Joh 9 — Tradition und zeitgenössische messianische Diskussion 245

W. Grundem, A Response to Gerhard Dautzenberg on 1 Cor. 12.10 . . . 253

J. Kärzinger, Frau und Mann nach 1 Kor 11, 11 f. 270

UMSCHAU UND KRITIK

Neutestamentliche Rezensionen 276

Alttestamentliche Rezensionen 284

Hinweise 314

FERDINAND SCHÖNINGH PADERBORN

ISSN 0006-2014

Biblische Zeitschrift

herausgegeben von

Dr. Vinzenz Hamp
Professor der alttestamentlichen Exegese
an der Universität in München

Dr. Rudolf Schnackenburg
Professor der neutestamentlichen Exegese
an der Universität in Würzburg

Neue Folge

Sonderdruck

Heft 2 1978

VERLAG FERDINAND SCHÖNINGH/PADERBORN

für die die Schiloh-Erwartung aus Gen 49, 8ff als messianische Erwartung des Pentateuch eine entscheidende Rolle spielt. Der Evangelist will durch die Darstellung des theologisch uneinsichtigen Verhaltens von Pharisäern und durch die Rede vom Gericht, das sich die zuziehen, die schon und doch blind sind, ebendiese Pharisäer zum Glauben an Jesus führen und zeigt ihnen den auch für sie theologisch verantwortbaren Weg über Jes 42, 6f zu Gen 49, 10 auf. Diese kontroverstheologische Situation scheint noch offener zu sein, als es durch den sicher späteren joh Einschub in 9, 22f den Anschein hat. Man spricht und argumentiert noch miteinander.

So stellt die joh Überarbeitung einer Blindenheilungsgeschichte aus der Tradition eine fachtheologische Auseinandersetzung dar, in der Kenntnis rabbinischer Argumentationsmethode, kombiniert mit der Methode des joh Mißverständnisses, sichtbar wird: Heiland eines Blinden, Licht der Welt – das ist der Schiloh, dem Proskynese gebührt, auch von Jüngern des Mose, die sich um das Verständnis von Gen 49, 10 mühen³⁰.

Erlangen, 16. August 1977.

Günter Reim.

A Response to Gerhard Dautzenberg on 1 Cor. 12. 10

In his brief study «Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Hintergrund der διακρίσεις πνευμάτων (1 Kor 12, 10)»¹, and later in his book, *Urchristliche Prophetie*², Gerhard Dautzenberg argues that 1 Cor. 12. 10 speaks not of "distinguishing between spirits" but of "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" (which are spoken through prophecy). Οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν in 1 Cor. 14. 29 then means, "let the others interpret" (what each prophet says). Professor Dautzenberg has done valuable work in challenging some of our uncritically-held assumptions about the meaning of διακρίσεις πνευμάτων in 1 Cor. 12. 10, and has also called to our attention many lexical and historical data useful for understanding oracle and dream interpretation in the ancient world. But it may be questioned whether he has established a convincing argument for translating 1 Cor. 12. 10, "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit". It is possible to summarize his argument in five points:

³⁰ Erstaunliche Parallelen zu Arbeitsweise und Theologie des Evangelisten in Joh 9 gibt es in joh Material in Joh 4:

a) Joh 4, 13–15 / Joh 9, 5: Deuterojesajanische Selbstprädikation als Wasser, das jeglichen Durst stillt (Jes 55, 1–3) bzw. als Licht der Welt (Jes 42, 6f).

b) Joh 4, 13 / Joh 9, 7: Der Messias kann getrunken werden bzw. in ihm kann man sich waschen.

c) Joh 4, 19 / Joh 9, 17: Die vorläufige Erkenntnis, daß Jesus Prophet ist – wohl das höchste Zugeständnis, das die joh Gesprächspartner hinsichtlich der Beurteilung Jesu haben machen können. Der Evangelist nimmt dieses Zugeständnis als Vorstadium zum vollen Glauben an Jesus positiv auf.

d) Joh 4, 25f / Joh 9, 35b–38: Das Gespräch mit dem Messias, in dem dieser sich dem Gesprächspartner offenbart.

e) Joh 4, 29 / Joh 9, 30. 32f: Die Verkündigung dessen, dem man begegnet ist, als (evtl.) von Gott.

f) Joh 4, 20–24 / Joh 9, 38: Gespräch über Proskynese bzw. vollzogene Proskynese.

g) Joh 4, 41f / Joh 9, 40f: Glaube bzw. Unglaube von Zuhörern.

¹ BZ 15 (1971), 93–104.

² Stuttgart, 1975, pp. 122–148.

1. The gift of *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* is connected with prophecy in 1 Cor. 12. 10 and 14. 29³.

2. *Διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* mean "interpret" and "interpretation" in these verses, for several reasons.

a. *Διάκρισις* and *διακρίνω* belong to Greek interpretation terminology. As such, they are used interchangeably with *συγκρίνω/σύγκρισις* to translate Hebrew / Aramaic רָפָּא / רָשָׁפָּא⁴.

b. Since there is often a connection between revelation and interpretation in post-biblical Judaism, a reference to such interpretative activity would have been understood by the Corinthians⁵.

c. This position would allow *διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* to be translated with the same sense (something not normally possible with other positions)⁶.

d. The other proposed meanings for 12. 10 and 14. 29, "distinguish", "judge", and "test", are all unacceptable⁷.

3. The history of religions argument in favor of the translation, "distinguishing between spirits", is inadequate, for neither 1 Th. 5. 19–21 nor 1 Jn. 4. 1–6 nor *Did.* 11 provides an adequate parallel⁸.

4. *Πνευμάτων* in 12. 10 means "revelations of the Spirit"⁹.

5. The context of 1 Cor. 12–14 requires this position:

a. If 1 Cor. 12. 3 provides a test for distinguishing between spirits, then that same interpretation is excluded for 12. 10¹⁰.

b. We have no evidence of a problem of false prophecy at Corinth at this point, but to translate "distinguishing between spirits", one would have to assume that¹¹.

c. In 1 Cor. 12–14 the gift of *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* is no "super-charisma" set over the others, but if it were a gift of distinguishing between spirits, it would certainly have come to assume such superior status¹².

It now remains to subject each of these five arguments to rigorous scrutiny, to see whether they compel our acceptance.

An Analysis of Dautzenberg's Arguments

1. *Διάκρισις πνευμάτων* is connected with prophecy in 1 Cor. 12. 10 and 14. 29.

Dautzenberg's argument in 12. 10 depends on his ability to divide the list of nine gifts in vss. 8–10 into four unequal groups, namely (i) *λόγος*

³ UP, 122f.

⁴ UP, 125; «Hintergrund», 94–102.

⁵ UP, 125.

⁶ UP, 123f, 126.

⁷ UP, 126–129.

⁸ UP, 129–135.

⁹ UP, 135–142.

¹⁰ UP, 143–146; «Hintergrund», 93.

¹¹ UP, 147.

¹² *ibid.*

σοφίας and *λόγος γνώσεως*; (ii) *πίστις, χαρίσματα λαμάτων* and *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*; (iii) *προφητεία* and *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*; (iv) *γένη γλωσσῶν* and *ἐρμηνεύει γλωσσῶν*. He says, «Wenn man jedoch die sachliche Zusammengehörigkeit von *pistis, charismata iamaton* (12,9) und *energēmata dynameton* anerkennt, wird das folgende Nebeneinander von Prophetie und *diakriseis* am besten durch ihr Neben- bzw. Nacheinander in der Gemeindeversammlung erklärt (14, 29)»¹³. Yet there are several difficult questions which must be answered before this classification can be accepted.

(a) *Is the connection between members of the first three groups the same kind of connection which exists between tongues and interpretation?* The answer must be no. The connection between tongues and interpretation is unique because they necessarily function together in the congregation. Interpretation cannot be exercised without tongues, and, according to Paul, tongues should not be exercised publicly without interpretation (1 Cor. 14. 5, 13, 27–28). But that is not the case with the other groups which Dautzenberg suggests. A word of wisdom can certainly be spoken apart from a word of knowledge. A miracle can be performed separately from a healing. Consequently, even if we were to admit some kind of relationship between prophecy and *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων* in 12. 10, it would not need to be the kind of relationship which Dautzenberg seeks to establish, a relationship of functional interdependence. Even if these two gifts were related in some way, we could still follow the analogy of Dautzenberg's first two groups and conclude that *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* is a gift that could function apart from prophecy.

(b) *Are there grammatical or stylistic indications that would enable Paul's readers to recognize these four groups?* Again the answer is no. There is no explicit division made by Paul at any point in the long sentence. Moreover, if there is any stylistic alteration at all it is found between *χαρίσματα λαμάτων* and *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*, where Paul ceases to mention the Spirit with each gift. But that change, if one thought it significant, would put works of miracles with prophecy and *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*, a classification different from the one Dautzenberg needs in order to establish his case.

Dautzenberg also suggests that there is a conscious arrangement by Paul so that the gifts which the Corinthians most overvalued are placed last, and also those which they would already have recognized as "pneumatika"¹⁴. But on neither ground could one explain why prophecy is fourth from the end. Certainly Paul was not concerned that the Corinthians would overvalue prophecy – quite the opposite (14. 1, 5, 39). And since gifts of healing or miracles, which would certainly have been acknowledged as "pneumatika", are placed only fourth and fifth in the list, it is difficult to think that there is any conscious arrangement from "less acknowledged" to "more acknowledged" gifts. Indeed, such an arrangement would mean that interpretation, the last gift in the list, was the one "most acknowledged" by the Corinthians! It seems much easier to think that tongues, the problem gift at Corinth, was consciously

¹³ UP, 122.

¹⁴ UP, 123.

reserved for last, and interpretation was joined to it, while the other gifts were listed with no conscious order intended.

c) *Do other Pauline passages indicate additional relationship between any two gifts such as the special relationship between tongues and interpretation?* Here also the answer must be no. The only special relationships which might be suggested are found in Rom. 12. 6, where prophecy is connected with faith (εἴτε προφητείαν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως), and in 1 Cor. 13. 2, where prophecy is connected with knowledge. But these connections argue against Dautzenberg's supposed groupings in 1 Cor. 12. 8–10, since there prophecy is separated from both faith and knowledge. And even these are not functionally interdependent relationships of the tongues-interpretation type, for one might have a gift of faith or knowledge without the gift of prophecy, and one might prophecy without having a special "charisma" of faith or knowledge. In 1 Cor. 14. 29 one might say that there is a special relationship between prophecy and διάκρισις πνευμάτων, but that contention depends on an assumption that 14. 29 refers to the gift of διάκρισις πνευμάτων, an assumption which will be challenged in some detail below.

Whereas tongues and interpretation are explicitly grouped together by Paul again and again in a way that his readers could not miss (12. 10 [where it is ἐρμηνεῖα γλωσσῶν], 12. 30, 14. 5, 13, 26, 27, 28), Paul can discuss prophecy in several places without any mention of διάκρισις πνευμάτων (Rom. 12. 6, 1 Cor. 12. 29, 14. 5, 24–25)¹⁵. In these contexts, if διάκρισις πνευμάτων had been essential to the proper functioning or understandability of prophecy, we might have expected it to be mentioned. So it is doubtful whether 1 Cor. 12. 8–10 implies any special relationship between two or more gifts, other than the special relationship between tongues and interpretation.

(d) *Is "faith, healings, miracles" really a convincing group?* Can one perceive, as Dautzenberg suggests, a «sachliche Zusammengehörigkeit» among these three gifts? Once again, it is necessary to express some doubt. Of course, this is not to deny that faith is in some way related to the gifts of healing and working of miracles. But because of its fundamental nature faith can be said to be related to several of the gifts, such as prophecy in Rom. 12. 6. The question, rather, is whether there is such an evident unity among faith, healings and miracles that we are compelled to say that Paul intentionally grouped them together. Neither stylistic evidence, nor discussion elsewhere, nor the intrinsic nature of the gifts, makes one sure that the group "faith, healings, miracles" indicates an intentional assembling by Paul of gifts which by nature belonged together. And if we have serious doubts about whether these three are intentionally juxtaposed, then can we entertain any certainty about whether there is in 1 Cor. 12. 10 an intentional relationship between prophecy and διάκρισις πνευμάτων?

(e) *Might Paul have simply listed several gifts in 1 Cor. 12. 8–10 as they came to mind, without intending to imply any special interrelationships among them?* In view of the preceding considerations, this certainly must be considered a strong possibility. Of course Paul must

¹⁵ I discuss 1 Cor. 14. 29 below

have consciously reserved tongues, the problem gift at Corinth, until the end, and with it its necessary concomitant, interpretation of tongues. But except for that special pair, one wonders if Paul had any other pairs or groups in mind. When he began to compile a list of gifts to show the diversity of the Spirit's working he may well have mentioned individual gifts as he thought of them. Δόγος σοφίας perhaps reminded him of λόγος γνώσεως, and from there many gifts came not in groups but individually to mind.

One probably cannot reach complete certainty on this question. But at least it can be said that the supposed connection between prophecy and διάκρισις πνευμάτων in 1 Cor. 12. 10 is certainly not an obvious one. Indeed, one may well question whether Paul intends to indicate any special relationship at all.

In 1 Cor. 14. 29 the question is different. Here Paul clearly relates prophecy and the activity indicated by the verb διακρίνω: προφηται δὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς λαλεῖτωσαν, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν. But it may not be so readily assumed, as Dautzenberg does¹⁶, that the activity designated here by the verb διακρίνω is the same as that designated by the phrase διάκρισις πνευμάτων in 12. 10.

In favor of such a connection are two factors, the proximity to a mention of prophecy in both 12. 10 and 14. 29, and the fact that διακρίνω in 14. 29 is the verb which corresponds to the noun διάκρισις in 12. 10. As for the first factor, I have argued above that it is very difficult to show that the juxtaposition of prophecy and διάκρισις πνευμάτων in 12. 10 is anything other than fortuitous. And to use 14. 29 as evidence for a special relationship between the two gifts in 12. 10, while using the relationship between the two gifts in 12. 10 to show that the same gift is discussed in 14. 29, would simply be to argue in a circle. Dautzenberg's case for one verse must be firmly established on independent grounds before he can use it to argue his case for the other verse.

Concerning the use of διάκρισις in 12. 10 and διακρίνω in 14. 29, it must be noted that both the noun and verb have an extremely wide range of meaning¹⁷. It is not at all impossible that Paul would have used διάκρισις in 12. 10 to mean "distinguishing" (among different kinds of spirits) while using διακρίνω in 14. 29 to mean something quite different, such as "evaluate" or "judge" (prophetic utterances). In fact, in 1 Cor. alone Paul uses διακρίνω in several senses: in 11. 31 it means "evaluate", in 1 Cor. 11. 29, "distinguish" (or "evaluate"), in 6. 5, "give a legal judgment", and 4. 7, "distinguish". In Rom. 14. 1 he apparently means "arguments" or "disputes" by διακρίσεις. In view of this wide range of Pauline meaning, it would be overly bold to assume that διάκρισις in 12. 10 must have the

¹⁶ On p. 123 he refers to general recognition of this connection in the literature on 1 Cor. But such a connection is surely not as generally recognized as Dautzenberg implies. Note the following commentators who hold that of ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν in 14. 29 refers not to those who have the gift of "distinguishing between spirits" but to the entire congregation: Barrett, 328; Bruce, 134; Godet, II, 303f; Lietzmann, 74; also E. Cothenet, «Prophétisme dans le Nouveau Testament», in: *Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplément*. Vol. 8, ed. L. Pirot et al. (Paris, 1972), col. 1296.

¹⁷ Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 274, says, "It is impossible to find a consistent rendering of the word *distinguish* (διακρίνειν), because Paul did not use it consistently".

17 Bibl. Zeitschrift, Neue Folge, 1978, Heft 2

same
activ
So
the g
an a
12. 10
exam
At
ness
is in
pretir
of co
what
order
circu
If
for a
stron
πνευμ
the p
that t
which
if we
disting
Se
a lim
any e
12. 29
seem
"disti
teach
at lea
judgn
writir
5:21;
refers
more
differ
Th
διάχρ
in 14.
as "in
14. 29
view
to cla
rence
In
is cor

18
19

examination it appears that we must retain serious doubt about the connection in both verses. In 12. 10 it seems unlikely that there is any intentional or meaningful connection between the two gifts, and in 14. 29, unless Dautzenberg can prove his view of 12. 10 on independent grounds, it is very improbable that there is any reference to the gift of *διάκρισις πνευμάτων*.

2. *Διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* mean "interpret, interpretation" here.

Dautzenberg has correctly pointed out that *διάκρισις* and *διακρίνω* can be used as technical terms for the interpretation of dreams in Philo²⁰, in Symmachus's translation of Gen. 40.8²¹, and in Pausanias and Artemidorus (both 2nd c. A. D.)²². To his list should be added the two instances in T. Abr. (A) 4²³.

He also notes that *διακρίνω* is used in Jos. A. 8. 148 (= Ap. 1. 114) to speak of "solving" riddles²⁴, and at least once in Greek literature is used of the interpretation of signs²⁵. Finally, there is one instance of *διακρίνω* to mean "explain, interpret" spoken oracles (*μαντεία*). This is Stobaeus, *Eklogai* 4. 50. 95 (5th c. AD), where he is quoting Juncus (a philosopher, perhaps from the 2nd c. AD, known only through the writings of Stobaeus)²⁶. Dautzenberg's one example of *διακρίνω* from the Apostolic Fathers, Herm. *Sim.* 2. 1²⁷, can be omitted here, for it simply means "consider, ponder" (a vine and an elm).

These instances of *διάκρισις* and *διακρίνω* can be summarized as follows:

| Meaning | Number of instances | Dates |
|---------------------------|---------------------|--|
| Interpretation of dreams | 20 | 1st-2nd c. AD (Philo, Symmachus, T. Abr., Paus., Artemid.) |
| Solving riddles | 2 | 1st c. AD (Josephus) |
| Interpretation of signs | 1 | 1st c. BC (Diod. Sic.) |
| Interpretation of oracles | 1 | 5th c. AD (Stobaeus), or perhaps 2nd c. AD (Juncus) |

It is certainly safe to conclude from this evidence that *διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* could be used as technical terms to refer to the interpretation

²⁰ «Hintergrund», 99f. Dautzenberg lists *διακρίνω* in Jos. 90, 104 and 143, and *διάκρισις* in Som. 2. 7 and Jos. 93, 110, 125, 269. To this list should be added *διακρίνω* in Som. 2. 4 and Jos. 248, and *διάκρισις* in Som. 2. 110 and Jos. 98 and 116.

²¹ «Hintergrund», 99 (*διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* once each).

²² «Hintergrund», 94f (Artemid. *Oneirocriticon*, 4, Proem; 4, 1; Paus. 1. 34. 5).

²³ This text is of uncertain date, but perhaps may be placed in the 1st century AD (*JDB* I, 21).

²⁴ «Hintergrund», 101.

²⁵ «Hintergrund», 95. He lists only Diodorus Siculus 17. 10. 5 (1st c. BC). Cf. also (perhaps) Mt. 16. 3.

²⁶ LS, xxvii, xxxvi.

²⁷ «Hintergrund», 102.

of dreams, at least from the 1st c. AD. Whether they could also have been used to interpret prophecies is still difficult to say. The single example from Stobaeus is the closest parallel, but it is very late, and it is not yet clear how similar this oracle was to early Christian prophecy. A better decision can be made after taking into account more information about the functions of *διάκρισις*, *διακρίνω* and other words used for interpreting obscure oracles or prophecies in the time of the New Testament. In this regard, several observations can be made.

(a) *Διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* are not generally used to translate *רשפ* and *רפ*. This contention is contrary to Dautzenberg's implication in *UP*, 125 and «Hintergrund», 100, 103, but it is clearly seen if all the data are examined. The following list gives the total number of times each Hebrew or Aramaic word is translated by the Greek words listed. This list includes every available example of direct translation of these words from the LXX, Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion²⁸.

| | LXX | Aq., Sm., Th. |
|--|--|---|
| <i>Aramaic</i> | | |
| <i>רשפ</i> (verb) | <i>συγκρίνω</i> 2 | |
| <i>רשפ</i> (noun) | <i>σύγκρισις</i> 8 <i>σύγκριμα</i> 4 <i>κρίσις</i> 4 <i>κρίνω</i> 2 | <i>σύγκρισις</i> 25 (all Th.) <i>σύγκριμα</i> 4 (all Th.) <i>κρίμα</i> 1 (Th. Dan. 5. 16) <i>ἐπίλυσις</i> 1 (Sm. Dan. 2. 25) |
| <i>Hebrew</i> | | |
| <i>רשפ</i> | <i>λύσις</i> 1 (Eccl. 7. 30) | |
| <i>רפ</i> | <i>συγκρίνω</i> 7 <i>ἀπαγγέλλω</i> 1 | <i>ἐπιλύω</i> 3 (all Aq.) <i>διακρίνω</i> 1 (Sm. Gen. 40. 8) |
| <i>רפ</i> | <i>σύγκρισις</i> 2 <i>διασάφησις</i> 1 | <i>ἐπίλυσις</i> 1 (Aq. Gen. 40. 8) <i>διάκρισις</i> 1 (Sm. Gen. 40. 8) |
| <i>Totals of all instances: συγκρίνω, etc.</i> | | |
| | <i>κρίνω, etc.</i> | 52 |
| | <i>ἐπιλύω, ἐπίλυσις</i> | 7 |
| | <i>διακρίνω, διάκρισις</i> | 5 |
| | other | 2 (both Sm. Gen. 40. 8) |
| | total | 3 |
| | | 69 |

The most remarkable result of this compilation is to show that out of 51 examples of a Greek translation of the Aramaic *רשפ*, it was not translated once by *διακρίνω* or *διάκρισις*. One may well question, there-

²⁸ These are the only examples of direct translation which are relevant for our purposes. Dautzenberg also mentions Philo's recounting of the Joseph story, but Philo often wanders so far from the Hebrew text in his discourse that, unless there are specific indications that he is attempting a translation at some point, his language can scarcely be counted as evidence for determining which Greek words were acceptable translations of a Hebrew word. (These lists were made by me by comparing a Hebrew concordance with Hatch-Redpath, with Field's *Hexapla*, and with the LXX text.)

fore, whether Dautzenberg is justified in considering many examples of *רשפ*-exegesis from Qumran as legitimate background material for understanding *διάκρισις* in 1 Cor. 12. 10²⁹.

With the Hebrew *רשפ*, *רפ*, and the loanword *רשפ*, out of 18 examples we find two instances of translation with *συκρίνω* and *διακρίνω*. These are both in Symmachus's 2nd-century AD translation and can be taken as further evidence of the fact that *διακρίνω* and *διάκρισις* could serve as technical terms to refer to the interpretation of dreams. But that does not necessarily imply that they could be used to translate *רפ* in other contexts.

Moreover, when members of the *רשפ* and *רפ* word groups are translated 52 times by *συκρίνω* and related words and only twice by *διάκρισις* or *διακρίνω*, it seems to be an unjustified blurring of the evidence for Dautzenberg to make such general statements as, «*συκρίνω* und *διακρίνω* haben ihr Gewicht als Deuteausdrücke gerade durch das griechisch sprechende Judentum erhalten»³⁰, or, «In jüdischen Texten begegnen *συκρίνω* und *διακρίνω* als Übersetzungsvarianten für *רפ* / *רשפ*»³¹. The evidence is not nearly as strong as those statements would suggest.

(b) In Jewish and Christian literature, *διάκρισις* and *διακρίνω* are not generally interchangeable with other *κρίνω*-words in interpretation contexts. Dautzenberg correctly points out that Philo in *Mig.* 19 and *Jos.* 158 uses *σύγκρισις* instead of his usual *διάκρισις* to speak of Joseph's interpretation of dreams. This does not show that *διάκρισις* and *σύγκρισις* are precise synonyms, but simply that at this particular point – the interpretation of dreams – the range of meaning of *σύγκρισις* came to overlap with that of *διάκρισις* (at least in Philo's usage). One can understand how this might have been so, when "combine" and "compare" were common meanings for *συκρίνω*, and "evaluate", "understand correctly" and "separate" were acceptable meanings for *διακρίνω*. Each of those activities played a part in interpreting dreams, and each term could have come to have the general sense "interpret" when applied to dreams.

Now this semantic overlap might or might not have occurred with *διακρίνω* and *συκρίνω* in other contexts, such as interpreting prophecies, or writings, or parables, etc. We cannot predict in advance whether that would happen or not. It is possible that one word group or both would remain as a technical term for interpreting dreams and would not be used in any other contexts to mean "interpret". In fact, in some contexts *συκρίνω* as "combine" and *διακρίνω* as "separate" (or *διάκρισις*, "separation") are used as exact antonyms: Philo speaks of death as the *separation* (*διάκρισις*) of things that had been in *combination* (*τῶν συγκριθέντων*) (*Leg. All.* 106; cf. *Quod Deus* 82), namely, soul and body.

What we do find throughout Jewish and Christian literature is that members of the *συκρίνω* and *διακρίνω* word groups are never interchangeable and never have overlapping meanings outside of the particular context of dream interpretation (Philo, *Mig.* 19, *Jos.* 158, and Symm. Gen. 40. 8). Distinct meanings are maintained in all other contexts

²⁹ «Hintergrund», 100f.

³⁰ «Hintergrund», 100.

³¹ «Hintergrund», 103; cf. *UP*, 125, 138.

throughout the NT, the LXX, the Apostolic Fathers³², Josephus³³, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the major Greek Pseudepigrapha³⁴, and the rest of Philo. This is true for the 161 extant examples of the συγκρίνω word group and the 215 extant examples of the διακρίνω word group³⁵. It is hardly legitimate, therefore, for Dautzenberg to adduce non-dream instances of συγκρίνω (such as the notoriously difficult 1 Cor. 2. 13)³⁶ as examples of places where it is synonymous with διακρίνω.

Nor can other κρίνω-words simply be exchanged with διακρίνω. Dautzenberg lists many instances where κρίνω or κρίσις can mean "interpret", and it is true that κρίνω in Classical Greek had a range of meanings very similar to that of διακρίνω³⁷. However, by the NT period the meanings of κρίνω and διακρίνω seem to have become distinct enough that there are no instances where κρίνω means "separate, distinguish"³⁸, whereas that is the most common meaning of διακρίνω. When Dautzenberg says, «... sachlich gibt es keinen Unterschied zwischen κρίνω und διακρίνω»³⁹, he is simply not giving adequate attention to actual usage in the NT. The differences in ranges of meanings are even more pronounced with other words using the root κρίνω-. Dautzenberg himself notes that ὑποκρίνομαι⁴⁰ and ἀνακρίνω⁴¹ have meanings different from διακρίνω in Biblical usage, and one could think of other clearly different examples such as ἀποκρίνομαι, ἐγκρίνω or κατακρίνω.

So once again the precise nature of the kind of evidence we are seeking with respect to διάκρισις in 1 Cor. 12. 10 and διακρίνω in 1 Cor. 14. 29 must be defined more carefully than Dautzenberg has done. It is not enough to show that some words based on the root κρίνω- can mean "interpret, explain". It must rather be shown that διάκρισις and διακρίνω can themselves mean "interpret, explain" when used in connection with prophecy.

(c) *Διάκρισις and διακρίνω are never used in Jewish or Christian literature to refer to the interpretation or explanation of prophecies or other obscure words.* When we come to seek precise and specific parallels to Dautzenberg's suggested meaning for διάκρισις and διακρίνω in 1 Cor. 12. 10 and 14. 29, we find not one example in all of Jewish and Christian literature: nowhere in more than 200 occurrences are these words used to speak of interpreting prophecies or other kinds

³² 1-2 Clem., Did., Barn., Ign., Polycarp, Hermas.

³³ The concordance is not yet available for the συγκρίνω word group, however.

³⁴ Works checked were those for which a concordance was available to me: 4 Maccabees, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Life of Adam and Eve, the Greek Apocalypse of Baruch, 1 Enoch, the Apocalypse of Ezra, the Paralipomena of Jeremiah, the Apocalypse of Sedrach, the Psalms of Solomon, the Testament of Solomon and the Letter of Aristeas.

³⁵ The total for the συγκρίνω group will be increased when that volume of the Josephus concordance becomes available.

³⁶ «Hintergrund», 103f; UP, 138-140.

³⁷ Cf. LS, 399, 996.

³⁸ BAG. 452; Lampe, 778.

³⁹ «Hintergrund», 95.

⁴⁰ «Hintergrund», 100.

⁴¹ UP, 123, n. 7; 248-250.

of obscure words⁴². Indeed, in all of Greek literature, Dautzenberg has produced no examples of διάκρισις or διακρίνω used in this way except the one late quotation in Stobaeus⁴³. So the sense he proposes for διάκρισις in 1 Cor. 12. 10 would be unique and unprecedented for its time.

(d) *Jewish and Christian authors prefer other terms when speaking of the interpretation or explanation of prophecies and other obscure words.* This is a highly significant factor. Since διάκρισις and διακρίνω are used of interpreting dreams (and perhaps also of "solving" riddles), we should realize that they *might* have come to be used of interpreting prophecies or other obscure words as well. But when we examine the actual data, it becomes clear that Jewish and Christian writers consistently prefer to use other terms when they have occasion to talk about the interpretation of utterances or writings which are difficult to understand. The following list includes a large number of instances where Jewish or early Christian authors use a Greek term to refer to the interpretation or explanation of any spoken or written words. (Terms used to refer to "translation" from one known language to another are not included here.)

Words Used to Mean "Interpret, Interpretation, Interpreter"

Interpretation or explanation of Scripture passages (or Mosaic laws)

| | |
|------------|--|
| διερμηνεύω | Lk. 24. 7 (of OT prophecies, at least in part); Philo, Sob. 33 |
| ἐξηγήσομαι | Jos. A. 18. 81, B. 2. 162; Philo Hyp. 7. 13 |
| ἐξηγήσεις | Jos. A. 1. 12; Philo Vit. Cont. 78 |
| ἐξηγητής | Jos. A. 17. 149, 214, 216; Philo, Spec. Leg. 2. 159 |
| ἐπίλυσις | 2 Pet. 1. 20 (of prophecies) |
| ἐπιλύω | Philo, Vit. Cont. 75 |
| ἐρμηνεύω | Lk. 24. 27 (D); Jos. A. 20. 264 |
| κρίσις | Jos. B. 6. 312 ⁴⁴ |

Interpretation or explanation of obscure sayings, or words difficult to understand

| | |
|------------|-----------------|
| ἐξηγήσομαι | Jos. A. 19. 196 |
|------------|-----------------|

⁴² Probably the closest instance would be Jos. A. 8. 148 (= Ap. 1. 114), where it is said that Solomon sent riddles to Hiram of Tyre, proposing that "τὸν δὲ μὴ διανοήματα διακρίναι τῷ λύσαντι χρέματα ἀποτίθειν". (Josephus gives this as a quotation from an otherwise unknown Phonician historian, Dios.) Διακρίναι here may mean "to understand" (the riddles) or "to discern, to distinguish" (the solutions), for λύω is used both here and a few lines later to mean "solve". Διακρίνω might also be taken to mean "solve", as a synonym for λύω but this would certainly not be a clear example. When not quoting someone else, Josephus himself chooses ἐπιλύω to speak of solving riddles and hard questions in A. 8. 167.

⁴³ There is one other problem with the quotation from Stobaeus: it refers not to interpreting a προφητεία but to interpreting a μαντεία, a term which often refers to mantic ecstacy among the pagans, and a term which Jewish and Christian authors never use of their own prophecies.

⁴⁴ I have not attempted to compile a complete list of the times κρίσις and κρίνω are used to mean "interpret". BAG. 452-454, give no instances for early Christian literature.

| | |
|-----------|--|
| ἐρμηνεία | Aq. Prov. 1. 6, Th. Prov. 1. 6; of writing on wall: LXX Dan. 5. 1 |
| σύγκριμα | (of writing on wall): LXX Dan. 5. 7, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 26, 30; Th. Dan. 5. 26 |
| συγκρίνω | (of writing on wall): LXX Dan. 5. 7; Th. Dan. 5. 16 |
| σύγκρισις | (of writing on wall): LXX Dan. 5. 17; Th. Dan. 5. 7, 8, 12, 15, 16, 17 |

Interpretation or explanation of parables which were otherwise enigmatic

| | |
|----------|---|
| διασαφέω | Mt. 13. 36 |
| ἐπίλυσις | Herm. Sim. 5. 5. 1, 5. 6. 8, 5. 7. 1 |
| ἐπιλύω | Mk. 4. 34, Herm. Sim. 5. 3. 1, 5. 3. 2, 5. 4. 2, 5. 4. 3, 5. 5. 1 |
| ἐρμηνεία | Sir. 47. 17 |

Interpretation of tongues

| | |
|--------------|------------------------------|
| διερμηνευτής | 1 Cor. 14. 28 |
| διερμηνεύω | 1 Cor. 12. 30, 14. 5, 13, 27 |
| ἐρμηνεία | 1 Cor. 12. 10, 14. 26 |
| ἐρμηνευτής | 1 Cor. 14. 28 (B, D*) |

This list shows 58 instances where Jewish or early Christian authors had occasion to speak about the interpretation or explanation of difficult or obscure words or sayings. The kinds of interpretation included here are conceptually the closest possible parallels to prophecy: they all have to do with spoken or written material, and they refer to Scriptural prophecies, to other types of Scripture, to enigmatic sayings (often of divine origin), to parables, and to tongues⁴⁵. It is significant therefore that not even one instance was found where *διάκρισις* or *διακρίνω* referred to this kind of interpretation.

This evidence implies that if Paul had wanted to speak of the interpretation of prophecies in 1 Cor. 12. 10 and 14. 29 he would almost certainly have used one of these terms which were commonly used to speak of the interpretation of prophecies and other kinds of speech similar to prophecy. He would not have used *διάκρισις* or *διακρίνω*.

The other two positive arguments Dautzenberg proposes, the connection between revelation and interpretation in post-biblical Judaism and the possibility of translating *διάκρισις* and *διακρίνω* in the same sense, do not retain much force in light of the preceding evidence. There could also be revelation which needed no interpretation⁴⁶, and words with such broad ranges of meaning as *διάκρισις* and *διακρίνω* could certainly take different senses in different contexts⁴⁷.

(e) "*Distinguishing between spirits*" is a much more likely meaning for 1 Cor. 12. 10. Here Dautzenberg objects that in all other proposed

⁴⁵ I have included tongues here because this kind of speech might possibly be considered similar to prophecy in that it was considered a speech gift empowered by the Holy Spirit. If someone should prefer to count these instances as "translation" and therefore dissimilar to prophecy, the total number of instances would be reduced to 50.

⁴⁶ See the examples on p. 265 below.

⁴⁷ Cf. pp. 262–263, above.

examples where *διάκρισις* means "distinguishing between", the two classes of things to be distinguished are always explicitly named (for example, Heb. 5. 14): *πρὸς διάκρισιν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ*⁴⁸. So if *διάκρισις* were to mean "distinguishing" in 1 Cor. 12. 10, the verse would have to say something like *διάκρισις καλῶν καὶ κακῶν πνευμάτων*.

Dautzenberg's objection is inadequate here because he only examines the examples given in Bauer's lexicon (Bauer, 367 = BAG, 184). When the other examples of *διάκρισις* are examined, it is clear that there are instances when the whole class of things among which distinctions are to be made is named (as in 1 Cor. 12. 10, if it means "distinguishing between spirits"). Philo, *Som.* 2. 39, speaks of the man who "aims at analysis and distinction of things" (*ὁ δὲ τομῆς καὶ διακρίσεως πραγμάτων ζηλωτής*)⁴⁹. In *Som.* 2. 35, Dan is the symbol of *distinguishing* and *analyzing matters* (*διακρίσεως δὲ καὶ τομῆς πραγμάτων*). *Plant.* 45 says that God placed man's mind in the universe to be played upon by opposing forces, that it might be called to distinguish between them (*ἐπὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τε αὐτῶν*)⁵⁰. 1 Cl. 48. 5, which speaks of a man *σοφὸς ἐν διακρίσει λόγων*, should probably be translated "wise in the distinguishing of words (or arguments)": Dautzenberg's objection that good and bad words are not specified⁵¹ sounds again like circular reasoning: (a) *διάκρισις* can only mean "distinguishing" when both items are named, because (b) it does not mean "distinguishing" in 1 Cl. 48. 5 or in other similar places; (c) it does not mean "distinguishing" in 1 Cl. 48. 5 because (d) both items are not named⁵².

Far from being linguistically unprecedented, as Dautzenberg claims, the interpretation "distinguishing between spirits" has several good stylistic parallels in Jewish and early Christian literature and should be considered a very likely meaning for 1 Cor. 12. 10.

To summarize this linguistic investigation: the translation "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" in 1 Cor. 12. 10 uses a meaning of *διάκρισις* which was unprecedented at the time of the New Testament. Furthermore, there were several other terms which Jewish and Christian authors regularly used to speak of the interpretation of prophecies or other obscure words. If Paul had meant "interpreting" in 1 Cor. 12. 10, he would almost certainly have used one of these other words, not *διάκρισις*. By contrast, "distinguishing between spirits" uses a common and widely-understood meaning for *διάκρισις*, and the stylistic construction has several good parallels.

⁴⁸ UP, 126f, 128.

⁴⁹ The immediately following context requires that *διακρίσεως* mean "distinctions", and not "interpretations", and so does the passage in *Som.* 2. 35 to which this refers.

⁵⁰ "Making decisions" is a less likely translation here, because *διάκρισις* generally has that sense only as a technical term for judicial decisions (LS, 399).

⁵¹ UP, 127.

⁵² Other examples grammatically similar to 1 Cor. 12. 10 but with different meanings for *διάκρισις*, are Rom. 14. 1, Philo, *Op.* 136, *Leg. All.* 1. 206, *Mos.* 1. 212, *Job* 37. 16 (AB). In none of these cases, are both items mentioned; rather, the whole class of things among which separations or divisions are to be made is named. Other texts which use *διάκρισις* to mean "distinguishing" are *Jos.* B. 2. 303, 4. 654; Philo, *Cher.* 127, *Som.* 2. 24, *Spec. Leg.* 1. 100, 340; perhaps T. Naph. 2. 8.

3. The history of religions argument.

Dautzenberg in this section attempts to show that neither 1 Th. 5. 19-21 nor 1 Jn. 4. 1-6 nor *Did.* 11. 7 is sufficiently similar to the situation one would have to suppose in 1 Cor. 12. 10 if it meant "distinguishing between spirits". It is interesting that these are the three texts he chooses to analyze, for only one of them - 1 Jn. 4. 1-6 - has any mention of evil spirits. He is of course correct in deciding that the other two texts have little to do with 1 Cor. 12. 10.

Yet the fact that Dautzenberg chose to deal only with these texts, all three of which mention prophecy, shows that he has made an entirely unwarranted assumption. He has assumed that *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* in 1 Cor. 12. 10, even if it deals with "distinguishing between spirits", only deals with distinguishing between spirits of the prophets. But 1 Cor. 12. 10 does not say *διάκρισις πνευμάτων προφητῶν* it simply says *διάκρισις πνευμάτων*. It is not legitimate to presuppose that 1 Cor. 12. 10 is restricted to the testing of prophets and prophecies. Bittlinger, for instance, mentions as examples of *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* some of the exorcisms of Jesus where he knew there was a demon present, and the cases of Elymas (Ac 13. 8ff) and the soothsaying girl (Ac. 16. 16-18)⁵³. Robertson and Plummer define the ability as, "The gift of discerning in various cases (hence the plur.) whether extraordinary spiritual manifestations were from above or not"⁵⁴. If we resist the temptation to read into the text a limitation to the testing of prophecies, then a more general definition, like the one just mentioned by Robertson and Plummer, is in order. Something like "the ability to recognize the influence of the Holy Spirit or of demonic spirits in a person", might be suggested.

This means that any situation in which first century Christians would have seen demonic influence was a potential opportunity for the use of the gift of *διάκρισις πνευμάτων*. Was some sickness the result of demonic influence (cf. Mt. 12. 22, Mk. 9. 32-34)? Then the person with this gift could recognize it, and the demon could be cast out. Was an evil spirit causing someone to interrupt preaching or teaching or worship services (cf. Ac. 16. 16-18)? Then the person with this gift could recognize the source of the trouble. Was someone prophesying by the power of an evil spirit (1 Jn. 4. 1-6)? Then the person with this gift could call attention to it. Since it was thought that demons were involved in pagan worship in Corinth (cf. 1 Cor. 10. 20f), one can imagine a large number of cases where this gift would have been thought useful. Once *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* is understood in this way, Dautzenberg's third objection loses its force.

⁵³ Bittlinger, *Gifts and Graces*, 46. Other commentators who see "distinguishing between spirits" as applying to more than just prophecy include Calvin, 263, Grosheide, 287f, Findlay, 889, and Lenski, 503f. Those who do restrict it to prophecy generally refer to 1 Jn. 4. 1-6 and *Did.* 11, but give no further arguments.

⁵⁴ *1 Corinthians*, 267. They soon say, "Perhaps the expression chiefly refers to the prophetic gift", but they do not restrict it to that.

4. The meaning of *πνευμάτων* in 1 Cor. 12. 10.

Dautzenberg rightly points to 1 Cor. 14. 12, where *πνεύματα* means "manifestations of the Spirit"⁵⁵, and 2 Th. 2. 2, where *πνεῦμα* apparently means "revelation of the Spirit"⁵⁶. He concludes that "revelations of the Spirit" is a possible rendering of *πνευμάτων* whereas "spirits" is unlikely, because Paul never used *πνεύματα* to refer to both good and evil spirits.

This argument is unsatisfying on both counts, however. The major problem with it is that there was a much better and less ambiguous word which Paul could have used if he had meant to speak of "revelations of the Spirit spoken by prophets", namely, *προφητεῖαι* (1 Cor. 13. 8, 14. 6, 1 Th. 5. 20). In 1 Cor. 14. 12 and 2 Th. 2. 2, the use of *πνεῦμα* to mean "manifestation of the Spirit" allows for a much broader reference, including several kinds of gifts in 1 Cor. 14. 12, and perhaps any kind of "spiritual" communication in 2 Th. 2. 2, such as a vision, a dream or a *bath qol*, as well as a prophecy: by using a general term, the reference in both cases is left as broad as possible.

But in 1 Cor. 12. 10, according to Dautzenberg, the reference is not to many kinds of spiritual manifestations, but simply to the interpretation of prophecies. It is even a different gift from the interpretation of tongues. In this case, Paul would not have used a general word like *πνευμάτων* which would have been ambiguous to his readers. He would rather have written *προφητειῶν*.

With regard to the second objection, one need not have a specific Pauline example to show that *πνεύματα* could easily be used and understood by first century Christians to refer both to evil spirits and to the Holy Spirit, 1 Jn. 4. 1 (*δοκιμάζετε τὰ πνεύματα*) is one clear example. And *πνεῦμα* could certainly be used to refer to an evil spirit (Mt. 8. 16, 12. 45, Ac 19. 12, 23. 8, 9, 2 Cor. 11. 4, Eph. 2. 2, 2 Th. 2. 2, 1 Tim. 4. 1, Rev. 16. 14, etc.). In fact, in all of early Christian literature, the meaning "manifestations of the Spirit" is quite uncommon for *πνεύματα*, and the meaning "spirits" (of whatever kind) is of course very common.

So the meaning "revelations or utterances of the Spirit through prophets", while possible, is unlikely in 1 Cor. 12. 10. It is doubtful whether Paul's readers would have understood *πνευμάτων* in that sense when another word, "prophecies", would have expressed it so clearly. It is much more likely that the Corinthians would have understood *πνευμάτων* in its common sense, "spirits".

5. The argument from the context of 1 Cor. 12-14.

Dautzenberg's primary argument here is that 1 Cor. 12. 3 already provides a test for distinguishing evil spirits, and one which anyone could apply. Therefore, 1 Cor. 12. 10 cannot speak of some similar ability which is limited only to a few individuals⁵⁷.

The weakness of this argument is that it fails to recognize the differences which could exist between 12. 3 and 12. 10. First, it fails to recognize that several of the gifts Paul mentions are simply *special* or

⁵⁵ UP, 137.

⁵⁶ UP, 140f.

⁵⁷ UP, 143-146.

"highly developed" abilities which correspond to *general* abilities possessed by all believers. Faith, words of wisdom and knowledge, teaching, administration and "helps" (1 Cor. 12. 28) are a few examples; more are found in Rom. 12. 7-8. So 1 Cor. 12. 3 might provide a general test for distinguishing those who are speaking under the influence of an evil spirit, and 1 Cor. 12. 10 could speak of a special ability possessed by those who were very proficient in evaluating speakers who were supposedly under some "spiritual" influence.

Second, there may be a difference in the type of evaluation done. While 12. 3 speaks of an objective test which could be applied to determine whether spoken words conformed to a certain explicit standard, 12. 10 may describe a more subjective or internal kind of evaluation. Robertson and Plummer say, "An intuitive discernment is implied, without the application of tests"⁵⁸.

Third, the test in 12. 3 seems to be applicable primarily to those who speak before the congregation, while 12. 10 may speak of an ability to evaluate many other people as well, such as those who are ill, those who perform miracles, etc.

These suggested differences are enough to show that the existence of one kind of test for evil spirits in 1 Cor. 12. 3 does not necessarily preclude the mention of a related but different ability in 1 Cor. 12. 10.

The other two arguments which Dautzenberg raises from the context of 1 Cor. 12-14 also make certain unjustified assumptions. The objection that there is no evidence of a problem with false prophecy at Corinth is based on an assumption that 1 Cor. 12. 10 would have to deal only with "distinguishing between the spirits of the prophets", an assumption which has been seriously challenged above. The objection that "distinguishing between spirits" would become a "super-charisma" if it existed, fails to recognize that distinguishing between spirits, like other gifts (such as words of wisdom, words of knowledge, teaching or administration), may well have been subject to confirmation or reevaluation by other members of the congregation.

So Dautzenberg's last argument, the argument from the context of 1 Cor. 12-14, does not raise any unanswerable objections against the view that 1 Cor. 12. 10 speaks of the ability to distinguish between spirits.

Further Objections to Dautzenberg's Position

Each of Dautzenberg's five arguments has now been examined in some detail, and each one has been found to have serious deficiencies. However, there remain some additional weighty objections to Dautzenberg's position which should be mentioned.

1. Dautzenberg's view lacks historical confirmation.

We must realize that there is simply no evidence that early Christian prophets ever actually spoke with the aid of an interpreter. When there are examples of prophets in Acts, for example, no interpreter is ever

⁵⁸ 1 Corinthians, 267.

mentioned (cf. Ac. 11. 28, 19. 6, 21. 4, 21. 9, 21. 10-11). Furthermore, these prophecies at least seem to have needed no interpretation: they were apparently immediately understandable to the hearers (cf. Ac. 11. 28, 21. 4, 21. 10-11). Yet 1 Cor. 14. 29 certainly seems to be a general procedural rule which Paul expected to be followed for every prophecy. And at least two, and perhaps several or all of the members of the congregation are comprehended in *οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν*. So if Dautzenberg is correct, should we not suppose that every prophecy would have to have been interpreted, and by two or more people in every case? This would make "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" a very prominent activity, and it would be difficult to understand why we have no other mention of it.

2. *Οἱ ἄλλοι* in 1 Cor. 14. 29 implies evaluation, not interpretation.

It must be noticed that Paul's instructions for the interpretation of tongues are general enough to allow the tongue-speaker himself to interpret his own utterance: *καὶ εἰς διερμηνεύτω*. The *εἰς* who interprets could be the one who speaks (cf. 1 Cor. 14. 13). This is acceptable where no evaluation or judgement is in view. But Paul's instructions with respect to prophets are different: *καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν*. Now if only interpretation or explanation of the prophecies was intended, there would seem to be no good reason to forbid the prophet himself from being his own interpreter by saying, "Let the *others* interpret". But if evaluation or judgement of the prophecies was intended, then the prophet himself would not be sufficiently impartial to pass judgement on his own prophecy. Then the phrase *οἱ ἄλλοι* would become very understandable: *others* must evaluate the prophecy, for the prophet himself cannot do it.

3. Dautzenberg's position is foreign to Paul's emphasis on the understandable nature of Christian prophecy.

Throughout 1 Cor. 14 Paul emphasizes the contrast between the gift of tongues, which are unintelligible and therefore require an interpreter, and the gift of prophecy, which is intelligible. If someone speaks in a tongue, no one understands him (14. 2), but one who prophecies speaks to men (14. 3). The tongue speaker needs an interpreter in order to edify the church, but the prophet apparently does not (14. 5). Tongues are unintelligible (14. 9), and drive unbelievers away (14. 23). But prophecy calls unbelievers to account and convicts them of sin (14. 24-25), presumably with words which they could understand⁵⁹.

Now it is true that the revelation to the prophet may not always be completely clear to him, and may in fact sometimes be obscure in parts. But there is a great difference between an understandable prophecy with a few obscure details, and a prophecy which is so obscure that it needs an interpreter in order to edify others.

⁵⁹ Dautzenberg realizes the force of this objection and tries to make 14. 24-25 speak of a special function of prophecy, that of «Überführung» (UP, 123, n. 7; 247f). But this is simply special pleading: 1 Cor. 14. 24-25 is part of Paul's overall argument for the use of prophecy instead of uninterpreted tongues in the worship service.

It is not enough, then, for Dautzenberg to object that, unlike tongues, prophecies are *intelligible* (that is, they are spoken in words which the congregation can understand), but they are not *understandable* (that is, their meaning is obscure). This position still does not explain how apparently *uninterpreted* prophecies can benefit the congregation.

Conclusion

Professor Dautzenberg's proposal that *διάκρισις πνευμάτων* in 1 Cor. 12.10 means "interpreting the revelations of the Spirit" (which are spoken by prophets) is supported by five major arguments. Each of these arguments, upon careful analysis, turns out to be unconvincing. In particular, it was found that many different words are used by Jewish and Christian authors to refer to the interpretation of prophecies and other inspired or obscure speech, but *διάκρισις* is not one of them. Nor was *πνευμάτων* a clear word to apply to "revelations of the Spirit" spoken through the prophets: *προφητειῶν* would have been much better. Dautzenberg's view also lacks historical confirmation and seems to conflict with Paul's emphasis on the understandable nature of prophecy and his desire that *others* respond to the prophecy (1 Cor. 14.29). So the more common translation, "distinguishing between spirits", is still to be preferred.

Bethel College, St. Paul, Minnesota/USA, Nov. 15, 1977. Wayne Grudem.

Frau und Mann nach 1 Kor 11, 11f

Nur wenige Stellen im Neuen Testament sind bezüglich ihrer Deutung so ungesichert und damit für eine überzeugende Übersetzung so problematisch wie die beiden Verse 1 Kor 11, 11f. Sie finden sich in jenem Abschnitt, in dem der Apostel die Forderung ausspricht, daß die Frau in der gottesdienstlichen Versammlung – wenn sie «betet oder prophetisch redet» – einen Schleier auf ihrem Haupt zu tragen habe 11, 3–16. Im Zusammenhang gehen den beiden Versen die Sätze voraus: «Das Haupt eines jeden Mannes ist Christus, das Haupt der Frau ist der Mann, und das Haupt Christi ist Gott 11,3 ... Darum soll die Frau (das Zeichen der) Macht (ἐξουσία) auf dem Haupte tragen, der Engel wegen» 11,10. Hier nun schließen sich die Sätze 11,11f an. Sie machen deutlich den Eindruck eines klärenden Zusatzes zum eben Gesagten. Unmittelbar darauf greift der Apostel nochmals seine Forderung auf, wenn er auf «die Natur» hinweist, durch die der Frau «das Haar als Schleier gegeben» sei 11,13–16.

Was bedeutet nun im Zusammenhang unser Einschub VV. 11f? Er besteht aus zwei logisch einander zugeordneten Sätzen. Wir wenden uns zunächst dem Vordersatz V. 11 zu. Denn gerade bei ihm bewegen sich die Erklärungen im Unsichern. Der griechische Text lautet: *πλὴν οὕτε γυνὴ χωρὶς ἀνδρός οὕτε ἀνὴρ χωρὶς γυναικὸς ἐν Κυρίῳ*. Für die bisher üblichen Übersetzungen und das entsprechende Verständnis ist – wie sich zeigen läßt – weithin die lateinische Vulgata von verhängnisvollem Einfluß ge-

Yves Congar

Situation und Aufgabe der Theologie heute

Aus dem Französischen übersetzt von O. K. März und G. Lehr
184 Seiten, Paperback 12,— DM. ISBN 3-506-71940-8.

Aus dem Inhalt: Die Theologie seit 1939 – Die theologische Forschung 1945–1965 – Die Theologie auf dem Konzil – Situation und Aufgabe der Theologie heute – Christus in der Heilsgeschichte und in unseren dogmatischen Traktaten – Über den rechten Gebrauch des »Denzinger« – Kirche und Welt in der Sicht des Zweiten Vaticanums.

»Diese Aufsätze des französischen Theologen berichten über die Entwicklung und den heutigen Standort der katholischen Theologie in einer höchst abge- wogenen Weise. Eine hohe Sachautorität wirkt sich dabei zugunsten einer klaren Darstellung auch schwieriger innertheologischer Auseinandersetzungen aus. Die Aufsätze sind eine hervorragende Orientierung über die wichtigsten theologischen Strömungen und Probleme der vergangenen Jahrzehnte.«

(Das neue Buch)

Zeitschrift für Publizistik in Kirche und Welt

Communicatio Socialis

In Verbindung mit Michael Schmolke (Salzburg), Karl R. Höller (Aachen) und Kees Verhaak (Nimwegen) herausgegeben von Franz-Josef Eilers svd (Aachen).
Jährlich 4 Hefte à 96 Seiten, Jahresabonnement 20,— DM.

CS bringt grundsätzliche Auseinandersetzungen und Untersuchungen über Themen aus dem Bereich Kirche bzw. Religion und Massenkommunikation, Berichte über publizistische Initiativen und Ereignisse aus aller Welt, Beiträge und Materialien zu den Themen Entwicklungshilfe und Mission. Themen der letzten Hefte waren u.a. Ein Gesamtkonzept katholischer Publizistik / Missionspresse im Wandel der Zeit, Publizistische Medienplanung für Entwicklungsländer »Catholic Media Council«, Der »Medien-Missionar« als neuer Berufstyp / Zeitgemäße Missionspublizistik, Verkündigungsstrategien im historischen Rückblick. – Den Hauptaufsatzen folgen Zusammenfassungen in englischer, spanischer und französischer Sprache gegeben.



Ferdinand Schöningh

D-4790 Paderborn, Postfach 1020